Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
School of Business: Faculty Publications and
Other Works

Faculty Publications and Other Works by
Department

2005

’Oh, You Use 098, You Must Be From Hercegovina?’
Communicating Identity in Everyday Consumer Rituals in Croatia
Katherine Sredl
Loyola University Chicago, ksredl@luc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/business_facpubs
Part of the Business Commons

Recommended Citation
Sredl, Katherine. ’Oh, You Use 098, You Must Be From Hercegovina?’ Communicating Identity in Everyday
Consumer Rituals in Croatia. Anthropology of East Europe Review, 23, 2: 90-93, 2005. Retrieved from
Loyola eCommons, School of Business: Faculty Publications and Other Works,

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications and Other Works by Department
at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in School of Business: Faculty Publications and Other
Works by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact
ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
© Indiana University's IUScholarworks, 2005.

"OH, YOU USE 098, YOU MUST BE FROM HERCEGOVINA?"
COMMUNICATING IDENTITY IN EVERYDAY CONSUMER RITUALS IN CROATIA

Katherine Sredl, University ofIllinois, Urbana-Champaign
During my preliminary dissertation
fieldwork in Zagreb and Split, Croatia, in 20022003, I found the debate over Croatian identity
played out in symbolic consumption very
interesting. I chose consumption because it is an
everyday act in which people actively create and
communicate identity to themselves and to others
(Douglas and Isherwood 1973). Often, they
communicate membership to social groups as well
as status (Solomon 1999). I thought that these
would be important issues since the post-Yugoslav
identity, as it was explained to me, is about
negotiating new identities in a changing political
climate. I noticed differences in style between
Hercegovci and other people from Zagreb, and I
sought understanding, from a local point of view,
of what this might mean. Informants from Zagreb
generally organized legitimate Croatians as
culturally European, and non-Croatians as
culturally "Balkan."
Post-socialism offers an opportunity to
study the social process in which national identity
is negotiated. The Yugoslav state attempted to
create a homogenous Yugoslav national identity,
for example. by glorifYing Yugoslav shared
peasant heritage (Banac 1999). Political and
cultural history of the Republics, and even within
the Republics, trumped efforts to present a
common peasant heritage at the Yugoslav level.
Critical discussion of the state did not create,
across the Republics, a sense of unity through
protest as might be expected in other movements:
rock musicians and their audiences understood the
music as expressing protest from the views of
Bosnia (New Primitivism), or Slovenia (Laibach)
but rarely a unified, Yugoslav protest identity
(Ramet 1999: 126-150).
Yugoslav project, nevertheless, did create
a common "other" within Croatia. The question of
why Croatia had a right to statehood and what the
borders would be, and who would be excluded,
remained rather unsatisfactorily answered for
many Croatians at the start of the first Yugoslavia
(Banac 1983). After 1945. Tito favored a new
narrative of unity in which all ethnicities
contributed to the anti-fascist to suggest ethnic
assimilation. There was also no formal national
reconciliation in Croatia after World War II
(Ramet 1999). Many Croatians, however,
experienced Yugoslavia as a politically and

culturally foreign occupying force, which created a
sense of Croatian unity, or at least distanced it
from many internal divisions. After Yugoslavia,
the transformation of political structures redirects
the construction of Croatian identity and its
"other." This research asks how these questions of
identity are addressed in everyday life.
For many Croatians from Hercegovina,
secession from SFRY was a chance to reinstate the
historical, "thousand year old dream of the
Croatian state," as well as an ethnically
homogenous Croatian state. For people in Zagreb,
it was a chance to leave the balkanization that
came with the influx of peasants into Zagreb, their
rise in political power, and their "backwards''
culture and political processes of Yugoslavia.
They could return to their European cultural and
political identity. With the victory of Franjo
Tudjman, who aligned himself with the
Hercegovina Croats at home and abroad, the
historic view of Croatian rights prevailed. Many
people from Hercegovina migrated to Zagreb; their
village networks took control of political and
cultural life, displacing Zagreb natives and
diminishing their hopes that postsocialism would
legitimate their political and cultural views. For
example, Tudjman's argument for annexing
Hercegovina was that this was not annexation of
the territory of a neighboring state. but reestablishment of Croatia's historic borders
(Hockenos 2003: 17-80; Tanner 1997: 275-289).
Tudjman censored media criticism of his strategy
(Udovicki and Ridgeway 1997: 267-280). This
discourse directed identity into the historical and
ethnic argument for Croatian statehood and created
the '·other" as those internal groups who opposed
it. Zagreb natives became the political and cultural
"other" in their city, just as migration and political
transformation were bringing in migrants from
Hercegovina. How was this tension negotiated in
daily life?
Once, at the beginning of the research
project, as I was searching for a hook to hang these
observations of contested cultural "Croatianness"
in the symbolic consumption realm, I happened to
tell a friend that my phone number was
098462843. He responded by saying, oh, you are
for the HDZ, which I took also to mean that I am a
Hercegovci (I'm not; my family is from Zagreb
and Slavonia). I decided to research why 098
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could be a symbol of cultural and inside/outside
Croatian identity.
Croatia Telecom (HT), which had been a
state-held company, completed the privatization
process in 1999. Under the guidance of
Hercegovci emigres in Germany, who were tied to
President Tudjman' s government, Deutsche
Telecom (DT) purchased a controlling share in
HT. Moreover, the state included a moratorium on
accepting bids from other fixed-line providers in
the privatization terms. For most informants, the
privatization of HT represented the pillaging of the
Croatian state's rich resources. They saw the HT
infrastructure as theirs; during SFRY they paid to
build state telecom. They anticipated privatization
would bring them a return on their investment.
They also anticipated that it would end the statesocialist monopoly style of services. Instead, they
understood that Hercegovci emigres close to the
Tudjman's party, the Croatian Democratic
Community, (HDZ) and foreign interests (DT)
profited at their expense. A small group of elites
controlled the telecom, creating a situation that did
not seem too different from state socialism. An
informant commented, "The war and that period
when the, uh, HDZ was in the government and all
of privatization, and all that happened with it was
horrible" (Silva Zagreb 32). As a consequence, HT
was unpopular with most Croatians. I recall a
friend from Dalmatia commenting, "I don't care if
Slobodan Milosevic owns the next service fixed
line company in Croatia, I hate HT and I am
switching when the moratorium is over" (Marie
Sinj 30).
At the end of 1999, HT introduced the
first mobile phone subscription service in Croatia
under the brand Cronet. Cronet was expensive, and
most subscribers were Hercegovci. Mobile phone
service was a way to communicate membership in
Croatia's new political and economic elite. In the
eyes of other Croatians, it also communicated
"balkanness" because of the way many people
used their phones. In Zagreb, fixed line prefixes
are related to neighborhoods, so telling an
acquaintance that your phone number is 4826 032
is a way to communicate your status of having an
apartment in the center. meaning you have deep
local connections and/or money. The Cronet phone
number prefix, 098, however, communicated
financial status. It also circumvented and added
uncertainty to the previously mentioned status
networks of place and connections. "You would
tell someone where you lived, and you would lie
about it and say you lived somewhere better. ..
Also you would not give your home phone number

but your mobile number so they would not know"
(Vera Zagreb advertiser 30). The newcomers used
their mobile number from Cronet which came to
be known as a "balkan" brand because of its
connection to HT and the privatization deal, who
was using it, and how they were using it. "HDZ
was ruled by Hercegovci and they were unliked
but they were really rich and they were on [HT
mobile]" (Vera).
In 2000, the symbolic field changed. The
Croatian government accepted the bid of Austria's
Vodafone to enter the Croatian market. VIPme and
its 091 prefix offered consumers an alternative to
the symbolic associations ofCronet and 098.
"VIPme [Vodafone] came on market and the
people didn't like HT so they went to VIP" (Vera).
With the introduction of 091, purgers (Zagreb
natives) were able to communicate their identity.
Just as the 48 prefix on Zagreb land lines stood in
for connections and/or money, 098 and 09I were
understood as signifying cultural identity: 098
stood in for "Balkan" and 091 for European. With
the changes in technology, consumers had applied
old meanings to new symbols. They were
organizing post-socialist changes to national
identity- the end of the Yugoslav cultural identity
project and the start of the Croatian project- along
historic lines of creating a national cohesion, and
who has the right to belong.

Hercegovci, ethnic Croatians from
Hercegovina, were powerful iN Tudjman's
administration (1990-1999), and in Croatian
economics, and many migrated to Zagreb from
Hercegovina or emigre communities abroad after
1991. Many informants from Zagreb questioned
the legitimacy Hercegovci power with the
argument that they were not culturally Croatia. In
general, this meant they did not speak Croatian
and their culture was foreign -they spoke a dialect
different from Zagreb and they were not civilized
and not European as purgers see themselves, i.e.
Hercegovci culture was "Balkan". Hercegovci,
who came from a mountainous borderland with
Bosnia, viewed themselves as "true Croatians" by
their historical resistance to the Ottomans and
Eastern Orthodox political, cultural, and economic
influence. This looked like historical fanaticism to
purgers. and as other scholars (Ramet 1999: 166)
have noted, like Croatians in !stria, who wanted
nothing to do with this type of"Croatianness". The
in and out groups were all united on one thing,
defining Croatian culture and history against the
East.
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It seemed to me that people in Croatia,
especially Zagreb, understood Hercegovci as
consuming more conspicuously than other groups.
Women and men Hercegovci are associated with
BMW cars and the mafia. An informant
commented, "'Young girls driving BMW at the
university, things like that, that's usually the
mafia" (Jagoda, 35 Zagreb). While the BMW is
usually a sign of status and stability in the US, in
Croatia, it is a sign of power related to corruption.
My friends pointed to Hercegovci cafes and
commented on them as places that the mafia
frequents. One friend from Zagreb calls them
kotsku glavi, square heads, because, she says, that
is how they look. Respondents describe
Hercegovci as lacking taste, extremely patriotic,
and behaving as a mafia- a closed society, helping
only its own, with ethically questionable business
and political behavior. This tension between
Hercegovci and purgers in a post-Yugoslav
climate of negotiating identity was the theme of a
play I saw, "staje smijesno, banda lopovska"
"what's so funny, you band of thieves".
An important aspect of the stories of
informants from Zagreb is that they react to the
changing social structure by re-defining their
status position on cultural grounds of westernness.
One respondent from Zagreb, who's parents are
from Zagreb and Ljubljana (Slovenia), described
the newcomers' pursuit of status goods, "'how do
they earn their money as they think only about
how much money they have ... it's totally a
cultural shock for let's say us [people from
Zagreb] who were not taught that way ... people
who come now from that part of Croatia
[Hercegovina] ... the values are totally, I mean,
wrong and they did not stand on healthy teet so
you can feel it on the street" (Marija 29 Zagreb).
Creating a homogenous Croatian
ethnicity in Croatia is a difficult project, since
most informants refer to Italian, Hungarian, or
Montenegrin grandparents. The literature tends to
center on the question of the civil and cultural
rights that the Croatian state ensures for ethnic
minorities (i.e. Serbs living in Croatia). Certainly,
minority rights are an important issue for
European states with particular political challenges
for post-socialist states emerging from
authoritarian national ideology. In my research,
however, I felt that for most informants, the first
national project was a cohesive Croatian ethnic,
historic, political, and cultural identity. One
reason, I believe, is that the Yugoslav political
climate did not allow for a negotiation of this
question. I also believe that another issue is that

ethnic identity is a complex process everywhere,
especially in Croatia, a borderland, where most
informants are ethnically mixed. Focusing on
ethnic identity makes very few people a legitimate
Croatian. For people from Zagreb, focusing on
cultural identity ensures their power. For
Hercegovci, historical identity makes sense
because it points to a distinct period in which they
were part of a Croatian nation.
I believe my findings support scholarly
notions ofOrientalisms and nestling Orientalisms
(Bakic- Hayden and Hayden, Todorova 1997).
Taking the question out of Serb/Croat context
pointed to me the importance of defining
"Croatian-ness" and how these are related to ideas
of the state's legitimacy. Moreover, most
informants disclosed that one parent or
grandparent was from another former Yugoslav
Republic, but they identified themselves as
Croatian. I felt that this informed an open
discussion of the problems of definitions of
ethnicity, because most people cannot claim to be
ethnically "pure" Croatians. Also, the country's
regions share different cultural and historical
influences. It felt as if the country was in a period
of negotiating who. if anyone was a Croatian. I
recall an advertiser commenting, "'We can't use
comedy in our ads, making fun of ourselves,
because it is too sensitive still. We don't know
who we are to make fun of ourselves" (Luka,
Zagreb 30). I think the question of national
identity is first to be dealt with between Croatians.
Once that is handled. dealing with ethnic
minorities can be perceived as non-threatening to
Croatian identity.
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